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Learned men see with an equal eye 
a scholarly and dignified priest, 
a cow, an elephant, a dog, 






Inequality in India is made particularly pervasive by the fact that India’s rigid social 
hierarchies are intertwined with longstanding quasi-religious principles.
3
 Notwithstanding the 
fact that equality, based on the intrinsic divinity of all beings, is a principle inherent to 
Hinduism,
4
 India has long been defined by a strict system of social stratification legitimated by 
perceived cultural and religious principles.
5
  
The hierarchies that define Indian society bear upon every aspect of life.
6
 In the realm of 
employment, hierarchical norms define the types of occupations into which a person might enter, 
as well as the conditions of employment she may expect to encounter.
7
 Many industries remain 
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de facto segregated by caste and gender.
8
 Prejudice often operates at a surface level, and a certain 
level of classification by social status is the norm rather than the exception.9 
Since employment discrimination in India is primarily the result of structural inequalities 
that assign a subordinate social status to women and disadvantaged minority groups, the problem 
is best addressed through a systemic approach that attacks the underlying hierarchies directly.
10
 
A substantive conception of equality is enshrined in India’s constitution, which directs the state 
to take affirmative action to empower women and disadvantaged minorities to compete on more 
equal terms with members of more privileged social groups.
11
  The government has been guided 
by this constitutionally sanctioned substantive impetus, and it has implemented a system of 
“compensatory discrimination” in the form of quotas for women and members of disadvantaged 
castes in government jobs.
12
 In taking a primarily substantive, rather than formal, approach to 
equality, India rightly recognizes that neutral application of laws and policies will perpetuate the 
subordination of already disadvantaged groups.
13
 Given the salience of social hierarchies in the 
Indian context, disadvantaged minorities contend with near insurmountable barriers to availing 
themselves of opportunity.  
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 3 
Despite its commitment to substantive equality, however, India’s existing approach to 
employment discrimination has fallen short of its egalitarian ideals.14 One explanation for this 
shortfall is the lack of a comprehensive employment discrimination framework that adequately 
addresses the myriad ways in which discrimination operates. The existing legal protections 
against such discrimination include constitutional provisions mandating equality
15
 and a handful 
of scattered criminal statutes. There is no umbrella employment discrimination statute to regulate 
private sector workplaces in India.
16
 Reservations, which constitute the primary means by which 
the government addresses employment discrimination, do not extend to the private or 
agricultural sectors. This is highly problematic, given the fact that these sectors together 
encompass nearly eighty percent of the workforce.
17
 The existing statutory provisions provide 
some measure of protection to women in the private sector workforce, but many of these 
protections do not address discrimination on the basis of caste.  
The social affliction engendered by entrenched hierarchies is exacerbated by the 
hesitance of the legislative and executive branches of government to take action, beyond the 
existing system of quotas, to benefit disadvantaged minorities.
18 
Compensatory discrimination 
has become a highly politicized endeavor, with various political parties vying for the support of 
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 In the process, influential members of nominally disadvantaged 
groups are unfairly benefited and the interests of the genuinely underprivileged are neglected.
20
  
The Indian Supreme Court has attempted to fill the void created by the legislature’s 
abdication of responsibility.21 Since the late 1970s, the Court has adopted an increasingly activist 
posture in an effort to uphold the rights of the disadvantaged.
22
 Despite the Court’s commitment 
to substantive equality, however, it has not been wholly immune from the regressive, traditional 
norms that pervade the rest of Indian society.
23
 The Court has also selectively superimposed 
formal equality principles on a vision of substantive equality colored by traditional norms, an 
approach that has at times yielded unsatisfactory results.
24
 The Court’s occasional reliance on 
traditional stereotypes has sometimes had the effect of calcifying social hierarchies.25  
While the entrenched hierarchies that undergird Indian society necessitate a substantive 
approach to equality that takes into account the painfully real social differences that limit access 
to opportunity for certain groups, India’s substantive approach has hitherto failed to generate the 
anticipated results. The deficiencies in India’s approach to substantive equality are the lack of a 
comprehensive framework addressing employment discrimination in its various forms and the 
selective intermingling of formal and substantive equality with traditional norms. This article 
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argues, therefore, that India’s commitment to equality in employment would be better realized 
through (1) a comprehensive employment discrimination framework, which would ease the 
litigation burden on disadvantaged victims, offer a wider range of remedies than those currently 
available under the constitution and criminal laws, and extend the protections of employment 
equality further than the limited sphere to which they currently apply and (2) a strong 
commitment to a primarily substantive approach, disentangled from  formal equality and free 
from the regressive effects of traditional stereotypes.  
2. HIERARCHIES 
 
Perhaps the most visible of India’s social hierarchies, the caste system, divides Hindus 
into four classes, called varnas: the Brahmins (priests), the Kshatriyas (warriors), the Vaishyas 
(businesspeople), and the Shudras (laborers), in order of descending authority.
26
 Below the caste 
system lies a fifth group, the Dalits, or scheduled castes, who have historically been subjugated 
through their perceived untouchability, whereby contact with them has been viewed as 
inauspicious and polluting.
27
 Within the larger varnas are various subcastes, or jatis, which vary 
from one region to another and which have, over the course of time, dictated the occupations into 
which a person might enter.
28
  The caste system is a complex social code, which, as per tradition, 
governs all aspects of human interaction, with the upper castes exercising considerable 
subjugating influence over the lower castes and those below the caste system.
29
 The almost total 
absence of intermarriage across castes reinforces these social divisions.
30
  The system is one of 
graded inequality, a factor that has significantly contributed to its continuing relevance because 
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of the incentive it provides at each level to maintain the status quo.
31
 Thus certain jatis among 
the Dalits, for instance those involved in the practice of manual scavenging, or the cleaning of 
dry latrines, are viewed as untouchables even among the Dalits.
32
  
 No less significant in Indian society is the hierarchy that separates men from women and 
draws for legitimacy upon gendered cultural values purportedly rooted in religious doctrine.
33
 
Traditional conceptions of women as being primarily suited to domestic roles have restricted the 
roles that women, in particular those of the upper castes, have played in the public sphere.
34
 
Women who enter the workforce have to overcome significant hurdles at every step of the way, 
from contending with familial and societal expectations that they remain in the domestic sphere 
to facing discrimination in all aspects of employment.
35
 Women of the lower castes are 
particularly vulnerable due to their position at the intersection of caste and sex discrimination.
36
 
These women account for the majority of those engaged in what are viewed as the most 
dangerous and degrading occupations and face significant opposition to any attempts on their 
part to empower themselves.
37
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 Inequality in India is particularly problematic because of the scale on which it occurs and 
its tendency to dominate all aspects of people’s lives.38 As Smita Narula notes, “India is an 
example of injustice in the extreme: the numbers affected are greater, the poverty is deeper, the 
atrocities are an every day affair, and enforced servitude and segregation is the norm.”
39
 
Pervasive de facto occupational segregation creates immediately apparent social division and 
limits the ability of members of disadvantaged groups to better their social position. Due to 
intensely discriminatory attitudes on the part of employers, skewed distribution of resources, and 
historical patterns of disadvantage, Dalits and the so-called backward classes (certain of the 
extremely disadvantaged Shudra subcastes) and women are often relegated to menial and/or 
undesirable areas of employment.
40
 The ingrained structures of inequality that constitute the 
framework of Indian society necessitate an approach to equality that takes into account the 
insurmountable barriers that prevent certain sections of society from availing themselves of 
opportunity.  
3. INDIA’S APPROACH TO EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 
 
The Indian government has primarily taken a substantive view of equality, with formal 
equality principles selectively applied in certain cases.
41
 In line with this substantive emphasis, 
the focus of the government’s efforts has been to compensate for and remedy existing social 
hierarchies.
42
 Substantive equality recognizes the existence of social classifications, and seeks to 
target those social structures that contribute to the subordination of historically disadvantaged 
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40
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41
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 Formal equality, in contrast, overlooks social classifications and attempts to ensure 
neutral application of laws and policies and non-discrimination among individuals.
44
 While 
substantive equality, with its recognition of real social differences between groups, embraces 
affirmative action in favor of disadvantaged groups as being in itself an essential part of equality, 




 The Indian Constitution contains both formal and substantive equality provisions, 
suggesting recognition on the part of the founders that uniformly applied formal equality would 
perpetuate the existing structural inequalities.
46
 Although the Constitution mandates equality 
under the laws and prescribes a merit-based regime of advancement in government employment, 
it also expressly endorses a vision of substantive equality that is anchored in affirmative action to 
empower minorities to compete on more equal terms with members of more privileged groups.
47
 
That the state has embraced this constitutional directive is evident in the fact that the primary 
approach the government has taken to eradicating employment discrimination is a system of 
compensatory discrimination in the form of quotas.
48
 Under this system, 49.5 percent of 
positions in higher education and government employment are reserved for members of the 
scheduled and backward classes.
49
 The reservation system for women is less comprehensive, but 
nevertheless sets aside one third of the seats in municipal (local) governments for female 
                                                 
43
 Claire McHugh, The Equality Principle in E.U. Law: Taking a Human Rights Approach?, 14 IRISH STUDENT L. 
REV. 31, 34 (2006).  
44
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47
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 This approach is complemented by various other affirmative action provisions 
implemented on a discretional basis by the state and central governments.
51
 Compensatory 
discrimination is rooted in the belief that in the absence of strict quotas, minorities disadvantaged 
due to rigid societal hierarchies will be denied access to gainful employment.52 There is also the 
hope that the increased presence of members of disadvantaged groups in positions of power will 
translate into more opportunities for members of these groups across the board. 
 In addition to the constitutional protections against employment discrimination, the 
legislature has enacted a handful of statutes that address various aspects of discrimination in the 
workplace. For the purposes of this analysis, the most significant of these statutes is the Equal 
Remuneration Act of 1976, which guarantees women equal treatment relative to similarly 
situated men in the workplace.
53
 The Equal Remuneration Act forbids discrimination in hiring, 
pay and conditions of employment between male and female workers engaged in the same or 




4. THE LIMITATIONS OF THE CURRENT SYSTEM 
 
 
Although India’s primarily substantive approach to equality in employment rightly 
recognizes the potential for perpetuation of existing hierarchies in the absence of special 
solicitude for the interests of the disadvantaged,
55
 the Indian approach has failed to generate the 
                                                 
50
 Raghabendra Chattopadhyay & Esther Duflo, Women as Policy-Makers: Evidence From a Randomized Policy 
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Paper Series, Working Paper No. 57, 2010).  
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anticipated results. The shortcomings of the Indian approach lie in (1) its limited reach, (2) the 
near abdication of responsibility by the legislative branch of government, and (3) the judiciary’s 
seemingly incoherent superimposition of formal equality principles on a vision of substantive 
equality colored by regressive cultural norms.   
4.1. The Lack of a Comprehensive Framework 
 The lack of a comprehensive legal framework to address employment discrimination in 
its various forms imposes significant barriers to the realization of robust equality of employment 
opportunity in India. India has thus far relied almost exclusively on its system of compensatory 
discrimination to root out such inequality, and this approach has met with only moderate 
success.
56
 A system grounded almost entirely on quotas is inherently limited because it 
disregards the manifold ways in which discrimination and structural inequality may operate in 
the workplace.57 So, for example, a quota system does not address disparities in wages, 
promotion opportunities, and conditions of employment. The limitations of India’s reservation-
based approach are compounded by the fact that reservations are primarily concentrated in 
relatively undesirable areas of employment such as menial or janitorial work.
58
 In this manner, 
members of disadvantaged groups remain segregated in areas of employment traditionally 
associated with their castes.59 Instructive in this regard is the experience of nearly a hundred 
Dalit workers in the city of Ahmedabad, who, despite having advanced degrees in a range of 
subjects, could find only janitorial employment.
60
  
                                                 
56
 Sridharan, supra note 29, at 111-12.  
57
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discrimination).  
58
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 Randeep Ramesh, Untouchables in New Battle for Jobs, THE GUARDIAN, Oct. 2, 2004, 
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 11 
In practice, reservations benefit less than one percent of the Dalit population.
61
 The 
private and agricultural sectors, which together account for a huge percentage of the total market, 
are outside the purview of reservations.
62
 The recent trend toward liberalization, with its 
concomitant privatization of industries, has further limited the compensatory discrimination 
system by taking these jobs out of the reach of reservations.
63
 Due to a range of factors including 
resistance on the part of private employers and the informal working conditions prevalent in 
agricultural work, these sectors have been left almost wholly unregulated.
64
 Although the Equal 
Remuneration Act and a smattering of other legislation provide women in private sector 
workplaces with some measure of protection from discrimination, members of the scheduled and 
backward classes are excluded from many of these protections under the existing statutory 
scheme.
65
 Discrimination outside the public sector is both blatant and rampant. To take one 
example, Prakash Chauhan, who held a masters degree in Commerce, found his offer of 
employment at an accounting firm rescinded upon the firm’s discovery that he was a Dalit. 
Chauhan was ultimately forced to take up sweeping when he could find no other employment.
66
  
Even for those nominally protected under the existing statutory scheme, effective 
recourse has proven difficult or impossible to obtain.67 The Equal Remuneration Act is a 
                                                 
61
 Narula, supra note 9, at 313.  
62
 Id., at 319. See also Thorat & Attewell, supra note 14, at 4144 (“(I)t appears that caste favouritism and the social 
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 Ramesh, supra note 60.  
67
 See Aditi Kavarana, Equal Remuneration Act 11 (Ctr. For Civil Soc’y, Working Paper No. 15, 2000), available at 
http://economics--www.ccsindia.org/ccsindia/policy/rule/studies/wp0015.pdf (citing Assistant Labour 
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criminal statute, which requires victims of employment discrimination to register complaints 
with labor inspectors designated by the states.
68
 The criminal system is limited in its ability to 
adequately address employment discrimination in its various forms.
69
 The penalties for violations 
of employment statutes are relatively minimal, and suffer from chronic underenforcement.
70
 The 
limited legal redress on offer disincentivizes complaints because victims have little to gain from 
expensive and drawn-out litigation that gives them little in the way of compensatory damages. 
Corruption is endemic, and labor inspectors tend to be overworked and underpaid.
71
 The interests 
of marginalized groups are thus often neglected.  
4.2.The Legislature’s Abdication of Responsibility 
 
India’s approach to employment discrimination has also fallen short of its egalitarian 
objectives because of the failure of the legislative branch of government to adequately fulfill its 
part in implementing substantive equality.72 Political expediency tends to drive all legislative 
decisions, and there is a perceived need on the part of legislators to appease vote banks.
73
 This 
has produced hesitance on the part of legislative decision makers to champion controversial 
initiatives to mitigate discrimination against minorities when these initiatives do not align with 
the political interests of the decision makers.
74
 Thus, influential members of nominally 
disadvantaged castes have been seen to benefit at the expense of the genuinely disadvantaged.
75
 
The highly politicized system of compensatory discrimination provides one example of this. It 
                                                                                                                                                             
Commissioner K.R. Sawhney as noting that enforcement of the Equal Remuneration Act is accorded minimal 
importance in Delhi).  
68
 Indira Hirway & Neha Shah, Labour and Employment Under Globalization: The Case of Gujarat, ECONOMIC AND 
POLITICAL WEEKLY, May 28, 2011, at 62.  
69
 Cf. Julie Suk, Procedural Path Dependence: Discrimination and the Civil-Criminal Divide, 85 Wash. U. L. Rev. 
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71
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74
 Sarkin & Koenig, supra note 23, at 552.  
75
 Id., at 550.  
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has been observed that new castes are continually added to the affirmative action rosters at the 
behest of politicians eager to secure their interest with these groups, with little inquiry into their 
backwardness or lack thereof.
76
 These castes, unlike the Dalits, vary widely in terms of their 
social and economic backwardness, and many are in fact economically and politically 
powerful.
77
 Few are ever removed from the reservation lists.
78
  
The legislative branch has repeatedly reneged on its obligation to introduce legislation to 
remedy the effects of discrimination on disadvantaged minorities. Although the need for an 
umbrella employment statute has been increasingly stressed in recent years, no concrete action in 
this direction has yet been taken.
79
 Nor has the legislature followed up on proposals to establish a 
centralized agency to address discrimination in employment.
80
 Large gaps remain in the 
employment discrimination framework, and there is little action taken to fill this void.  
The legislature’s inadequate discharge of its responsibilities has forced the judiciary 
branch of government to assume an increasingly activist position.
81
 One example of this activism 
is the Court’s creation of so-called public interest litigation, a framework by which public 
interest agencies and members of the public are empowered to litigate claims on behalf of 
                                                 
76
 The Dalits, in contrast, tend to be almost uniformly marginalized. Reservations tend to dominate any discussion 
on empowering Dalits, and other important considerations are inadequately explored. In this regard, commentator P. 
Sainath has observed, “In the media, any debate on Dalit rights is about reservation, and not about water, health, 
sanitation or land rights. In the minds of the media audience, we have created a stereotype that Dalit is equal to 
reservation, which is taken out of the context of all these other deprivations.” Trend of Repackaging Casteism 
Growing, THE HINDU, Dec. 7, 2007, http://www.hindu.com/2007/12/07/stories/2007120759081200.htm.  
77
 Narula, supra note 9, at 325.  
78
 Pager, supra note 10, at 338.  
79
 See Anti-Discrimination/Sex Equality, supra note 13 (noting that in 2006, the Sachar Committee had 
recommended adoption of a new framework for addressing discrimination against minorities in employment, and 
arguing that “India needs an equality legislation that protects multiple characteristics, extends beyond the private 
and public divide and addresses manifest discrimination in society”). 
80
 See id. (highlighting the 2008 Menon Committee’s recommendation that an Equal Opportunity Commission be 
formed to address the grievances of minority workers).  
81
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underprivileged victims of government discrimination and inaction.
82
 In Vishaka v. State of 
Rajasthan, the Supreme Court of India filled a conspicuous void in employment discrimination 
law by issuing a comprehensive set of sexual harassment guidelines binding on public as well as 
private employers.
83
 The context in which these guidelines were issued was a case in which a 
government employee was raped in retaliation for her work against rural child marriage.
84
 The 
activist posture of the Court is underscored by the point that the facts of the case did not 
implicate sexual harassment in private sector workplaces. In drafting these guidelines, the 
Supreme Court pointed to the complete absence of legislation addressing the pervasive problem 
of sexual harassment in the workplace.
85
 The Court acknowledged the shortcomings of a 
judicially mandated sexual harassment framework, but maintained that the importance of the 
issue necessitated extraordinary action.
86
 It stipulated that its guidelines would be binding only 
until appropriate legislation was enacted to cap the shortfall.
87
 Legislative inaction has thus 
created a situation in which the Supreme Court has had to assume an increasingly prominent role 
in shaping employment discrimination policy.  
4.3. The Supreme Court’s Intermingling of Formal and Substantive Equality   
 
The effective implementation of substantive equality in the realm of employment has also 
been hindered by the Supreme Court’s seemingly random intermingling of formal equality 
principles with a substantive equality framework that has at times drawn upon regressive cultural 
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norms.88 The Court’s embrace of a primarily substantive approach to equality is reflected in its 
recognition of the differences between social groups.
89
 Thus the Court has repeatedly upheld the 
validity of affirmative action schemes to benefit disadvantaged castes and women. The Court has 
noted that a strictly neutral application of laws and policies, as required by formal equality, will 
not meaningfully implement the guarantee of equality enshrined in the Constitution.
90
 Although 
the Court has, on many occasions, appropriately recognized the disparities in social standing 
among different groups, it has not uniformly applied these substantive equality principles in 
cases involving extremely underprivileged parties.91  The Court has on occasion resorted to a 
shortsighted, selective application of formal equality principles, and the incoherence of the 
Court’s doctrine in this regard has yielded unsatisfactory results. 
In Air India v. Nergesh Meerza, the Court was confronted with a discriminatory policy 
that distinguished between the male and female members of the cabin crew of India’s biggest 
airline. Air India established separate cadres, with separate terms of employment, for the male 
assistant flight pursers and the female airhostesses.
92
 The two classes performed substantially 
similar types of work.
93
 The policy at issue required airhostesses, but not assistant pursers, to quit 
(1) upon marriage, if it occurred within four years of joining the airline, (2) upon conception of a 
child, and (3) upon reaching the age of thirty-five, unless granted a special extension up to the 
                                                 
88
 Kannabiran, supra note 25, at 90.  
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 In a convoluted opinion that mixed substantive and formal equality 
provisions, the Court upheld certain parts of the policy while striking others. In upholding the 
clause that required airhostesses to remain unmarried for four years after joining the airline, the 
Court reasoned that the provision was in the interests of the employees.
95
 In the Court’s view, the 
requirement would ensure that airhostesses would only enter into the institution of marriage 
physically prepared and with the necessary maturity.
96
  The Court also upheld the differential 
retirement ages for airhostesses and pursers, observing in this regard that the two cadres were 
separate classes and therefore did not have to be governed by the same terms of employment.
97
  
It stipulated, however, that extensions of employment up to the age of forty-five were to be 
granted on a non-discretionary basis provided that the airhostess in question was in good health, 
in order to ensure non-discrimination within the airhostess cadre.
98
 Finally, the Court struck 
down the prohibition on pregnancy, remarking that “divert[ing] the ordinary course of human 
nature” in this manner was “an open insult to Indian womanhood—the most sacrosanct and 
cherished institution.”99 It wholeheartedly sanctioned, however, a proffered alternative version 
of the provision that mandated retirement upon an airhostess’ third pregnancy.
100
  
Upon nearly identical facts, in July 2003, the Supreme Court in Air India Cabin Crew 
Association v. Yeshawinee Merchant reversed a Bombay High Court decision mandating non-
discrimination between the male and female cadres, upholding in full its 1989 Nergesh Meerza 
decision.
101
 In delivering its opinion, the Court noted that some of the airhostesses were members 
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of the union that had negotiated these disparate terms.
102
 It reflected, with regard to the earlier 
retirement age mandated for airhostesses, that “[t]here is nothing objectionable for airhostesses 
to wish for a peaceful and tension-free life at home with their families in the middle age and 
avoid remaining away for long durations on international flights,” apparently overlooking the 
fact that the airhostesses challenging the policy were not so inclined.
103
 Perhaps most 
surprisingly, the Court, viewing the union’s negotiation of the conditions of retirement as 
evidence that the airhostesses considered this a provision “favourable to them,” categorized this 
provision as the type of “special treatment” authorized by the Equal Remuneration Act to be 
performed in favor of women.
104
 In other words, the Court interpreted the substantive equality 
exception to the Equal Remuneration Act, which permits the government to take special action 
for the benefit of women, to allow Air India to mandate that its female employees retire at an 
earlier age than similarly situated males.  
 Nergesh Meerza is widely cited by scholars as a thorn in the Supreme Court’s substantive 
equality jurisprudence.
105
 In interpreting the equality provisions of the Constitution, the Court 
employed myopic and circular reasoning that essentially upheld continuing discriminatory 
treatment based on a superficial division of men and women into different classes which 
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 See id. (“Where terms and conditions are fixed through collective bargaining as a comprehensive package deal in 
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assigned men arguably preferable terms of employment.106 The results fell far short of the 
egalitarian objectives expressed by the framers of the Constitution. 
 Consistent with a substantive approach to equality, the Nergesh Meerza and Yeshawinee 
Merchant Courts viewed themselves to be acting for the particular benefit of female workers, 
whom they perceived as being differently situated and having different priorities from their male 
coworkers. The Court believed that in permitting airhostesses to negotiate terms purportedly 
favorable to them, it was acting in their best interests.107 This approach to substantive equality 
ultimately failed because it assumed, on the basis of regressive gendered norms, that male and 
female employees had different priorities.108 It imposed what it believed to be substantive 
equality of opportunity to negotiate terms of employment without inquiring into the actual 
bargaining power of women within the union or the ways in which the gendered context in which 
they were operating limited their ability to negotiate better terms for themselves.109 
Compounding the problem was the Court’s myopic application of formal equality. It 
essentially viewed the airline’s classification of male and female employees into separate cadres, 
with attendant disparate terms of employment, as evidence of these two cadres being separate 
classes not similarly situated for the purposes of formal equality analysis. Although the Court 
applied formal equality within the class of airhostesses, to strike down the discretionary aspect of 
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 See Kannabiran, supra note 25, at 95 (noting that the Court required no demonstration on the part of the employer 
that the tasks assigned to the male and female staff were sufficiently different to justify differential treatment of the 
two classes).   
107
 See Yeshawinee Merchant, supra note 101 (“In employment requiring duties on Air craft, gender-neutral 
provisions of service may not be found necessarily to be beneficial for women. The nature of duties and functions on 
board of an Air craft do deserve some kind of a different and preferential treatment of women compared to men.”). 
108
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extensions beyond the default age of retirement, it refused to mandate that the airline offer the 
same terms of employment to male and female employees. This was so despite the Court’s 
acknowledgment of a substantial similarity in the types of work performed by the airhostesses 
and the pursers.
110
 In accepting the airline’s superficial distinction between the two classes based 
on discriminatory terms of employment and the purportedly different interests and priorities of 
the two groups, and in refusing to require equal conditions for similar work, as required by the 
terms of the Equal Remuneration Act, the Court intermingled substantive and formal equality in 
such a manner as to render both doctrines ineffective.  
5. SOLUTIONS  
 
5.1. Legislative Solutions  
 
The deeply ingrained and multilayered structural inequalities that underlie Indian society 
necessitate the adoption of a substantive approach to equality that takes into account the fact that 
actors differently situated may not benefit in the same ways from a uniform application of 
equality principles.
111
 However, India’s existing approach to substantive equality has yielded 
unpredictable and unsatisfactory results in part because the existing framework is limited in its 
reach and flawed in its approach to employment discrimination.  
 The limitations of a primarily reservation-based system and the inadequacy of the current 
statutory scheme to account for various types of discrimination against a full range of 
disadvantaged groups significantly qualify the ability of the current framework to address the 
problem of employment discrimination.112 One possible solution that has been increasingly 
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proposed in recent years has been to extend reservations to the private sector.
113
 However, this 
step would have to be carefully considered in view of the significant opposition such proposals 
have met in the private sector.
114
 India is a developing country, with strong reasons to encourage 
a competitive business environment, and the possible detrimental effects of such legislation on 
industry would therefore need to be fully explored.  
 A less drastic solution might involve the legislation of a comprehensive umbrella 
employment statute,115 which would guarantee freedom from discrimination in the workplace to 
a full range of disadvantaged minorities. Such a statute would articulate the types of adverse 
actions that would qualify as illegal employment discrimination and the remedies to be made 
available to victims of such discrimination. It might impose a responsibility on private employers 
to take reasonable steps to ensure the full participation of minorities in the workplace. Given 
existing hierarchies, such a provision would necessarily require that employers make certain 
reasonable accommodations to create an environment in which disadvantaged workers would 
have the opportunity to function on par with their more privileged coworkers. An employment 
discrimination statute would provide guidelines for the Courts in interpreting state guarantees of 
equality, and would extend equality protections to the private and agricultural sectors. It might 
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incorporate a presumption in favor of disadvantaged employees in order to ease the extremely 
heavy burden of litigation.116 
 The existing employment discrimination framework would be further enhanced through 
the provision of positive incentives such as tax breaks, subsidies, and new business licenses to 
encourage employers to hire more workers from disadvantaged groups and to take extraordinary 
steps to ensure substantive equality in the workplace. Employers should be encouraged to 
educate themselves and their employees about their rights and responsibilities under the law. 
Positive incentives would likely be met with a greater level of acceptance within the private 
sector than are more drastic remedies such as private-sector reservations. They would carry the 
additional benefit of ensuring a happier and better-trained workforce, as employers would be 
incentivized to provide such accommodations as additional training for workers from 
disadvantaged groups.  
 The limitations of the existing framework might be further addressed through the 
provision of civil remedies in addition to the existing criminal penalties for violations of 
employment law. The Equal Remuneration Act is a criminal statute, which prescribes fines and 
imprisonment for illegal discrimination.117 Although the criminal law places the responsibility of 
prosecuting offenses on the state, and thereby alleviates the burden of litigation on victims of 
employment discrimination who may have limited financial resources, the absence of damages 
may disincentivize the pursuit of judicial remedies. Concomitantly, the relatively minimal 
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penalties associated with infractions fail to deter employers from engaging in discrimination.
118
 
Widespread corruption among labor inspectors and the fact that the inspectors are overworked 
and underpaid result in failure to adequately prioritize women’s interests.
119
 These obstacles 
deter prospective complainants from asserting their rights under the Act. The provision of a civil 
cause of action may bridge this gap by providing incentives for victims to seek judicial recourse 
and by ensuring that, at least in some cases, those pursuing judicial remedies will have a vested 
interest in the outcome. High-profile employment litigation, with significant damages at stake, 
may act as a general deterrent to employers who might otherwise discriminate with impunity.  
To ensure adequate protection for complainants with limited means, the Indian 
government should explore possible incentives to encourage public interest organizations and 
other entities to help provide adequate legal representation.120 Members of disadvantaged groups 
are often unaware of their rights, and thus cannot take advantage of the protections afforded them 
under the law.
121
 An agency that could work in tandem with the Courts and would have the 
power to oversee, investigate and litigate employment disputes would help fill this gap.122 Such 
an agency would presumably have the resources to effectively issue concrete guidelines that 
would help employers remain within the bounds of the law and would assist the Courts in 
reaching informed judgments.123 It would also have the power to oversee the actions of labor 
inspectors and to address allegations of corruption and misconduct within their ranks. 
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A more comprehensive framework, which would flesh out and expand the existing 
protections, would help ensure robust substantive equality in the realm of employment 
discrimination law. However, given the failure of the legislature thus far to fulfill its part in 
upholding substantive equality aside from the system of reservations, the judiciary may be called 
upon to continue to take an active role in paving the path to fuller minority rights. 
5.2. Judicial Solutions  
 
The fact that the legislature has been relatively reluctant to take bold steps, other than in 
the form of reservations, to protect disadvantaged minorities from discrimination in employment, 
has meant that the judiciary has taken a more active role in upholding the rights of the 
underprivileged.
124
 Some of the judiciary’s actions have been problematic, but in the overall 
analysis, it has stepped in to fill the vacuum created by the legislature’s inaction.
125
 Although 
structural solutions are more properly the province of the legislature, which has the resources and 
temporal bandwidth to enact effective policies, in the current circumstances, it may continue to 
fall to the judiciary to take the necessary steps to prod the legislature into fulfilling its part in 
upholding substantive equality.126  
Vishaka opens up a means by which the judiciary may be able to provide interim 
solutions to the deep-rooted structural inequalities in India.
127
 In Vishaka, the Court issued sexual 
harassment guidelines that were to be binding upon employers until the legislature enacted a 
comprehensive sexual harassment law.128 Following the decision in Vishaka, the Parliament 
introduced a sexual harassment bill that publicly acknowledged the Court’s role in helping to 
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bring this matter to the notice of the legislature.
129
 Although, as was observed by the Court itself, 
judicially imposed corrective measures may not be an ideal solution, they may in some measure 
alleviate the worst of the problems that exist in the employment sphere.
130
 Such action on the 
part of the Court may also play a useful role in prodding the legislature into action.131 The 
legislature has often found it expedient to let the Courts take the first step in addressing divisive 
matters that have the power to backfire against legislators, who are directly accountable to the 
people.
132
 Whatever one may think of the legislature relinquishing its obligations in this manner, 
it might quite possibly be more willing to act when the Court has already confronted divisive 
issues in the first instance.  
In its interpretation of the state’s guarantees of equality, the judiciary should strive for a 
richer vision of substantive equality free from the regressive effects of traditional norms. 
Substantive equality as a matter of principle recognizes that in an intensely hierarchical social 
context, members of disadvantaged groups are not similarly situated to members of more 
privileged groups such that formal equality would provide meaningful protection. When there is 
a significant disparity in the social standing of individuals, a neutral application of laws and 
policies will operate to the disadvantage of subjugated groups. However, for substantive equality 
to be meaningful, it cannot rely on the very stereotypical norms that underlie existing social 
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classifications.133 Judicial legitimization of regressive stereotypes has the effect of reinforcing 
social hierarchies that serve to devalue certain people at the expense of others.134  
 Nergesh Meerza and Yeshawinee Merchant demonstrate that the intermingling of 
substantive and formal equality without regard to the ways in which hierarchical norms define 
the social position and expectations of members of disadvantaged groups exacerbates existing 
structural inequality. A strict application of formal equality, which would have invalidated the 
classification between pursers and airhostesses, may have produced more palatable results in 
these cases; however, it has been observed that formal equality often works to the disadvantage 
of subordinated groups in intensely hierarchical contexts.135 
To adequately account for the differences in social standing and access to opportunity 
between privileged and underprivileged groups, the judiciary should as a matter of general 
practice first look at cases through the lens of a substantive equality approach designed to 
dismantle those factors that operate to perpetuate the subordination of the disadvantaged. Formal 
equality should be applied only as a secondary approach, upon establishing that the relevant 
parties are in fact meaningfully similarly situated such that application of formal equality will not 
merely overlook existing structures of subordination.  
A more effective approach to substantive equality in Nergesh Meerza and Yeshawinee 
Merchant would have examined more closely the ways in which the collective bargaining 
process operates to the disadvantage of the airhostesses. Such factors as the relative bargaining 
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power of the airhostesses within the union and the possibility that the same gendered 
expectations that originally led Air India to create separate male and female cadres might impose 
limitations on the airhostesses’ ability to meaningfully negotiate would be relevant to this 
inquiry.136  
 Formal equality should be limited to cases where the relevant parties are employed in 
similar positions and are similarly situated in terms of their relative advantage or disadvantage. 
In a hierarchical employment context in which women and members of the scheduled and 
backward classes are routinely assigned subordinate positions and inferior terms of employment, 
it may well be that members of these groups are not similarly situated relative to more 
advantaged employees such that application of formal equality would yield satisfactory results.  
6. CONCLUSION  
 
India’s approach to substantive equality has only been modestly successful in alleviating 
the deep-seated structural problems that facilitate discrimination in employment. The existing 
system addresses only isolated aspects of the problem because it primarily rests on a system of 
quotas that pertain only to the public sector and because it does not incorporate a comprehensive 
statutory scheme that addresses intended and unintended discrimination in its various forms and 
against a full range of disadvantaged groups.  
 The legislature’s failure to take decisive action to address discrimination in the workplace 
has exacerbated the problem. The employment discrimination framework remains extremely 
fractured, and the rights of the scheduled and backward castes and women are neglected. This 
inaction has forced the judiciary to take on an extremely activist posture to protect the rights of 
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the disadvantaged, a circumstance which could prove problematic in certain situations.
137
 
However, in the absence of effective legislative policy, the judiciary should continue to further 
the cause of substantive equality in the manner employed in Vishaka.
138
 This kind of activism on 
the part of the Court may provide interim relief and serve the purpose of prodding the legislature 
into fulfilling its part in upholding substantive quality. 
 In interpreting the state’s guarantees of equality, the judiciary should apply a primarily 
substantive approach free from the regressive effects of traditional values and norms. Formal 
equality should be applied as a secondary framework, after establishing that the relevant parties 
are similarly situated in terms of their levels of (dis)advantage, such that the application of 
formal equality principles will not perpetuate existing social hierarchies. A more robust 
substantive equality of opportunity will, it is to be hoped, be a step towards eradicating the 
structures of subordination that operate as barriers to advancement in all spheres of life.  
 
  
                                                 
137 See Sood, supra note 18, at 847- 48 (highlighting the dangers of judicial overreaching, including lack of 
accountability on the part of judges and the potential loss of credibility that could result from the judiciary venturing 
into policy matters beyond its competence).  
138 See id., at 846 (underscoring the importance of judicial activism in India, given the severity of inequality in this 
context and the possibility that people may resort to extra-legal remedies in the absence of judicial recourse).  
